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I. Introduction 
A. Enactment of the Anti-conspiracy law   
On June 15th, 2017, the Japanese government enacted the law on the Punishment of 
Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (the Anti-conspiracy law).1 The Anti-
conspiracy law newly covers 227 crimes to punish acts at the stage of conspiracy.2 Although 
the official abbreviated name for the Anti-conspiracy law is the Offence to Criminalize an Act 
in Furtherance of Planning to Commit Terrorism and Other Serious Crimes, the new law is 
so-called the Anti-conspiracy law in that it is the first time that Japan adopted a general 
framework of criminalization of anti-conspiracy.3 
 
B. The Anti-conspiracy law is a type of “preventive detention”. 
Based on the Japanese government's explanation, this Anti-conspiracy law was enacted 
mainly to prevent terrorisms.4 That is the reason that the government called its abbreviated 
name as the Offence to Criminalize an Act in Furtherance of Planning to Commit Terrorism 
and Other Serious Crimes, putting the word “terrorism”.5 By applying law, based on the 
government’s explanation, it would be possible to prevent terrorism in advance because this 
law enables to arrest and detain future terrorists at the stage of conspiracy.  
                                                 
1 see the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), ‘Statement on the Enactment of the Bill to 
Revise the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, Including the 
Criminalization of Conspiracy’ (JFBA, 15 June 2017) 
<https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/170615.html> accessed 28 August 
2019. 
2 see The Japan Times, ‘Stop and Rethink Conspiracy Bill | The Japan Times’ (The Japan Times, 26 
May 2017) <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/26/editorials/stop-rethink-
conspiracy-bill/#.XWTeNSgzY2w> accessed 27 August 2019. 
3 see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 21 March 2017) </press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000356.html> 
accessed 27 August 2019; see Kanako Takayama, Kyobozaino naniga mondaika [What are the 
problems of the Anti-conspiracy law?] (Iwanami Shoten, Publishers 2017) 6. 
4 see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (n 3). 
5 ibid. 
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One might deny regarding the Anti-conspiracy law to be categorized as a type of “preventive 
detention.” Though there is no internationally agreed-upon definition, the most pervasive 
definition of "preventive detention" is "persons arrested or imprisoned without charge.”6 Many 
experts have similarly defined the term as the ‘deprivation of liberty for imperative reasons of 
security without criminal charge.’7 Based on these experts’ definitions, Claire clarifies that 
preventive detention is a framework of detention outside the operation of State criminal law, 
and does not contemplate criminal charge, prosecution or judicial trial.8 In Japan, even under 
the Anti-conspiracy law, imprisonment or detention “without charge” is not accepted.9 In other 
words, the Anti-conspiracy law’s detention framework is within the criminal procedure and 
thus, based on Claire's definition, the detention framework under the Anti-conspiracy law 
seems to be out of the scope of the ‘preventive detention’.  
 
However, this narrow conception of ‘preventive detention’ should not be accepted. Elias 
argues preventive detention can be applied to detention framework of those within a penal 
code.10 While denying the definition of ‘preventive detention’ mentioned above, Elias proposes 
three types of preventive detentions as a substitute, namely pre-trial detention, immigration 
detention, and national security detention.11 Though Elias mentions eight criteria to form these 
three types of “preventive detention”, the most fundamental criterion is the legal basis.12 Elias 
points out preventive detention can be categorized depending on the power to detain people 
                                                 
6 Stella Burch Elias, ‘Rethinking Preventive Detention from a Comparative Perspective: Three 
Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects’ (2009) 41 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 99, 
110. 
7 Claire Macken, Counter-Terrorism and the Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Preventive 
Detention and International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2011) 6. 
8 ibid 7. 
9 see Toyoji Saito ' Preventive Detention in Japan' in Stanisław Frankowski and Dinah Shelton 
(eds), Preventive Detention: A Comparative and International Law Perspective (M Nijhoff 1992) 
177. 
10 see Elias (n 6) 116. 
11 ibid 128. 
12 ibid 114,115. 
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and a country is categorized in pre-trial detention framework if the jurisprudential and/or 
legislative basis for its detention of terrorist suspects is anchored in its criminal law and penal 
code.13 Based on his categorization, the Japanese Anti-conspiracy law is within the scope of 
the pre-trial detention framework because the law is along with criminal procedure and enables 
to detain suspects before trial.14 Though Elias analysis numerous countries, Japan is not 
mentioned in his essay because he focuses on common law, commonwealth countries and 
European democracies.15 However, this does not mean his categorization is limited to these 
countries. As Elias suggests including more civil law countries would bolster the strength of 
his essay’s conclusions, his definition would be also applicable to Japan, which is regarded as 
a civil law country.16  
 
This essay supports Elias’s categorization of three-types detention framework for two reasons. 
First, the traditional narrow conception of “preventive detention” may have caused inaccurate 
and insufficient analysis among scholars. Though Elias criticizes only American scholars for 
their limited analysis, this criticism may be also true to Japanese scholars.17 While not a few 
Japanese experts analysis the Anti-conspiracy law by comparing other countries’ conspiracy 
law,  there seems to be insufficient arguments from the perspective of preventive detention.18 
This may be due to a lack of recognition that the Anti-conspiracy law can be categorized as a 
type of preventive detention. Broadening the definition of preventive detention may deep 
insight about the Anti-conspiracy law. Second, there is no standard, internationally agreed 
definition of preventive detention yet.19 In other words, different interpretation including Elias’s 
one can be possible. Therefore, Elias’s definition of preventive detention should be approved 
and this essay analysis the Anti-conspiracy law with acceptance that this law is a type of 
                                                 
13 ibid 129. 
14 Shinichiro Koike, Youko Yonekura and Daisuke Yamada (eds), Kyobozai Konmentaaru 
[Commentary of the Anti-Conspiracy Law] (Gendai Jinbun Company 2019) 107. 
15 see Elias (n 6) 108. 
16 ibid; see Takayama (n 3) 5. 
17 see Elias (n 6) 105. 
18 see Koike, Yonekura and Yamada (n 14) 228–243. 
19 Elias (n 6) 110. 
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“preventive detention”. 
 
C. Structure of this essay 
This paper aims to reveal various problems the Anti-conspiracy law has. Before pointing out 
the problems, understanding Japanese situation about preventive detention is needed.  
Hence, in the following chapter, this essay tries to introduce Japanese history of preventive 
detention and the Japanese government’s efforts to enact the Anti-conspiracy law. The 
government explained the Anti-conspiracy law is against terrorism and this essay focuses on 
history from this point of view. 20 Thus, this essay does not introduce Japanese history of 
preventive detention for the mentally disordered, though Japan has a long history of this 
measure, because these measures are categorized as psychiatric health care and does not 
necessarily relate to terrorisms.21 Similarly, preventive detention for drunkards is also out of the 
scope of this essay.22On the other hand, the Maintenance of the Public Order Act, which was 
enacted in 1925 and abolished in 1945, should be noted.23 The Japanese government enacted 
the Act against communists, who the government regarded threats to the nation.24 Considering 
the fact communists questioned the regime of the nation at that time and the government 
explained those who try to change the national policy using violence would be punished under 
the Act, this measure has some similarities with counter-terrorism measure.25 Some academics 
point out there are numerous similarities between the Anti-conspiracy law and the Maintenance 
of the Public Order Act.26 Moreover, some experts even call the Anti-conspiracy law as the 
renewed version of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act.27 From these perspectives, in the 
                                                 
20 see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (n 3). 
21 see Frankowski and Shelton (n 9) 171. 
22 see ibid 172. 
23 see ibid 170. 
24 ibid. 
25 see Hideo Hiraoka and Yuichi Kaido, Shin kyobozaino kyohu: kikenna heiseino 
chiannizihou[Terror of new Anti-conspiracy law:  Dangerous Heisei-era’s Anti-conspiracy law] 
(Ryokuhu Publication 2017) 204, 206. 
26 Koike, Yonekura and Yamada (n 14) 240. 
27 Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 207. 
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first half of the following chapter, the background, abuse, and abolishment of the Act will be 
introduced. After that, in the latter half of the chapter, this essay aims to reveal the background 
of the Anti-conspiracy law by introducing previous attempts from 2003 to 2005 by the Japanese 
government to enact a law of anti-conspiracy, and strong oppositions from Japanese people.  
  
Then, in the first half of the second chapter, this essay tries to introduce how the Japanese 
government succeeded in enacting the Anti-conspiracy law for its fourth attempt. By 
comparing explanations with the previous ones by the government, this essay tries to reveal 
political manoeuvres by the government. Then, in the latter half of the second chapter, this 
essay tries to reveal problems of the Anti-conspiracy law under an international human rights 
law. Japan, which is located in East Asia, is not under control of any regional international 
law such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on 
Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.28 Therefore, these 
regional frameworks are out of the scope of this essay. On the other hand, Japan ratified the 
main international treaties including the ICCPR.29 As mentioned before, the Anti-conspiracy 
law enables to detain future terrorists and inevitably causes deprivation of the right to liberty. 
Thus, the most relevant article of the ICCPR may be Article 9, which prescribes the right to 
liberty. After clarifying the meaning of the article especially the word ‘arbitrary’, this essay 
attempts to reveal some problems of the Anti-conspiracy law under Article 9 of the ICCPR by 
focusing on concerns raised by Mr. Joseph Cannataci, the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
privacy.30 
 
In the third chapter, this essay aims to clarify problems of the Anti-conspiracy law with 
reference to other countries’ practices. Though it has been two years since the Anti-
conspiracy law came into effect, there have been no arrested cases under the law so far.31 
                                                 
28 see Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (Second 
edition, Cambridge University Press 2016) 290. 
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976)999 UNTS 171(ICCPR). 
30 Joseph Cannataci, ‘Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy’ (18 May 2017). 
31 Asahi Shinbun Company, ‘Asahi Sinbun Degital ’ Kyo Bo Zai Se Ko Ninenn “Tekiyounashi”’ 
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Considering that analyzing problems of the law in terms of jurisprudence in Japan is not 
possible, it is useful to analyze and compare with other countries' practices of preventive 
detention because this would enable to give potential problems that the Anti-conspiracy law 
has. Though analyzing more countries’ practices would deepen the insight about the Anti-
conspiracy law, under the limitation of volume of the essay, this essay would pick up two 
countries for reference.  
First country that this essay picks up is the United Kingdom. The reason is that the United 
Kingdom recently shifted its detention framework from the immigration one into the pre-trial 
one.32 There are arguments about the shift and by analyzing the discussion, this essay aims 
to reveal whether the Anti-conspiracy law is desirable as a pre-trial detention framework.  
As a second practical reference, this essay picks up the United States considering this 
country was the one that was attacked by the atrocious terrorist attack on 11 September 
2001.33 After the attack, the United States drastically reinforced its national power against 
terrorism, which caused serious human rights violations issues.34 Then, by revealing these 
issues, this essay tries to gain  implications for the Japanese Anti-conspiracy law.  
 
 
II. The history of preventive detention -The Maintenance of the Public Order Act and the 
Japanese government ’s efforts and failures to enact the Anti-conspiracy law- 
A. The History of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act 
1. Enact of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act 
Japanese history of preventive detention dates back to World War II period. Historically, 
until the end of World War II, the Japanese Emperor was regarded to have absolute 
power.35 Under the Imperial Constitution, which was promulgated on the 11th February 
                                                 
(Asahi Newspaper Digital: No Application of the Anti-Conspiracy Law for Two Years)’ (10 July 
2019) <https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14089943.html> accessed 28 August 2019. 
32 Elias (n 6) 172. 
33 see Shane Darcy, ‘Preventive Detention and Post-September 11th Legislation Human Rights 
Focus’ (2002) 5 Trinity College Law Review 158, 162. 
34 see ibid. 
35 see Elisa Bertolini, ‘Western and Japanese Constitutional Thought in the Shaping of the Role of 
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1889 and entered into force the following year, the Emperor was regarded as sacred and 
inviolable and had all sovereign powers.36 Communists questioned this absolute power of 
the Emperor and there was a concern that some extreme communists planned to murder 
the Emperor.37 Based on the situation, the government regarded communists as threats to 
the nation and needed to take measures against them.38 Thus, the Maintenance of the 
Public Order Act was enacted in 1925.39 Though not mentioned explicitly in the Act, its real 
purpose by the government was to repress communists.40  
 
At first, preventive detention was not included in articles of the Maintenance of the Public 
Order Act. The Japanese government tried to introduce preventive detention against 
“thought offenders” in the 1927 preparatory draft and 1934 draft, targeting communists.41 
These drafts proposed two years of detention in order to reform their beliefs.42 However 
strong opposition was held in the Imperial Diet believing "thought offenders" would not be 
reformed even under detention because most of them had a strong belief and believed in 
their crimes.43 These opposed people suggested indeterminate sentences instead of 
preventive detention.44 In the end, these drafts did not pass the Diet at that time.45  
 
2.  Adoption of preventive detention under the Maintenance of the Public Order Act  
                                                 
the Japanese Emperor in the 1889 and 1946 Constitutions’ [2018] Historia Constitucional 641, 
656,665. 
36 see ibid 656. 
37 see Frankowski and Shelton (n 9) 170. 
38 see ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 Hakaru Abe, ‘The Former Japanese System of Preventative Detention’ (1961) 3 J. INT’L COMM. 
JUR. 99, 99. 
42 ibid. 
43 see ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
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In 1939, World War II broke out and Japan took part in the war. 46  The Japanese 
government thought it was necessary for the people of Japan to unite and for this purpose, 
it became very important for the government  to take adequate measures against “thought 
offenders”, mainly targeting against communists.47 Under this necessity, the Act was 
largely revised to have stronger measures against “thought offenders”, including the 
adoption of the concept of preventive detention for the first time in Japanese history.48 
Under the Act, a person who plans to the commission of changing national policy or polity, 
or deny the system of private property, is subjected to punishment.49 When arrested under 
the Act, a person could be detained continuously after the expiration of a prison period if 
he had not changed his thought pattern and showed eminent danger of repeating the 
political offenses listed in the law.50 Moreover, under the revised Act, a paroled ex-prisoner 
or a probationer of a political offense could be detained based on a prediction of future 
“criminal” conduct.51 
 
3. Abuse of the Maintenance of Public Order Act 
When proposing the Maintenance of Public Order Act, the Japanese government 
explained there was no risk of abuse of the Act by police because the scope of the 
Act was severely limited.52 However, contrary to the government’s explanation, this 
Act became so abusive that it caused hundreds of thousands of innocent people 
arrested just because their beliefs were against the national policy and more than 
one thousand people died due to torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, or other 
                                                 
46 see ibid. 
47 see ibid 99–100. 
48 Frankowski and Shelton (n 9) 170. 
49 Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 204. 
50 Frankowski and Shelton (n 9) 170. 
51 ibid. 
52 Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 204. 
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reasons.53 This may be the reason that the Maintenance of the Public Order Act was 
regarded as the most notorious law in Japanese history.54 
 
One of the most tragidic examples was the death of Takiji Kobayashi. He was a 
famous Communist writer in Japan and published a novel Kanikosen (The Crab 
Canning Ship), which was regarded as a peak of a genre called proletarian 
literature.55 He was targeted by police because of his activities as a Communist. One 
day, under the Act, he was called to a police station in Tokyo for investigation.56 After 
several hours, he died in the police station and his corpse was handed to his family.57 
Though the police published his cause of death as a heart attack, numerous scars 
and bruises all over the body explicitly showed the fact of the severe torture inflicted 
upon him.58 One of his friends took a picture of the body and published the photo 
after World War II.59 A lot of Japanese people still remember the miserable image of 
the photo as the notorious history of their own country. Moreover, this history reminds 
the danger of giving the power of police under the name of preventive detention. 
 
4. Abolishment of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act in 1945 
The Maintenance of the Public Oder Act was abolished in 1945 but it was not 
because the law was regarded as abusive or ineffective.60 Japan lost World War II in 
                                                 
53 NHK, ‘The Maintenance of the Public Order/Clip/’ 
<https://www2.nhk.or.jp/school/movie/clip.cgi?das_id=D0005403086_00000&p=box>. 
54 see Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 207. 
55 See Haruo Abe, ‘Self-Incrimination--Japan and the United States’ [1955] Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology and Police Science 613, 691; Ulrich Heinze, ‘System Theory as Global Sociology-
Japanese Ramifications of Parsonian and Luhmannian Thought’ (2013) 44 The American 
Sociologist 54, 62. 
56 Abe (n 55) 691. 
57 see ibid. 
58 ibid 619. 
59 See ibid. 
60 Abe (n 41) 102. 
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1945 and the occupation by the Allied Powers began.61 The General Headquarters of 
the Allied Forces (GHQ) pushed the democratization of Japan and through this 
process, on October 4, 1945, the GHQ published a memorandum titled “Removal of 
Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties”.62 In this memorandum, the 
GHQ requested to abolish systematic repression of freedoms such as the freedom of 
thought and speech that the Japanese government had been systematically 
controlling.63 Based on this directive, the system of preventive detention was 
abolished due to the abrogation of the Maintenance of Public Order Act.64  
 
B. Efforts and failures by the Japanese government to enact an anti-conspiracy law 
 
1. The first attempt by the government and its failure 
(1)  The first attempt by the government to pass "a bill to amend a part of Penal Code to 
manage the globalization and organization of crime” 
 
In this section, this essay aims to introduce a brief history of the Japanese government’s 
continuous efforts and failures to enact a law of anti-conspiracy from 2003 to 2005. 
Before succeeding to enact the law in 2017, as shown in the next chapter, the 
government submitted almost the same bill three times and none of them succeeded to 
pass the National Diet.65 
  
First attempt was held in 2003. The Japanese government proposed a bill which is 
named as "a Bill to amend a part of the Penal Code to manage the globalization and 
                                                 
61 Ryuichi Yamakawa, ‘Strangers When We Met: The Influence of Foreign Labor Relations Law and 
Its Domestication in Japan’ [1995] Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 363, 370. 
62 see National Diet Library, ‘Glossary | Birth of the Constitution of Japan’ (Birth of the Constitution 
of Japan) <https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/glossary.html> accessed 23 August 2019. 
63 ibid. 
64 Frankowski and Shelton (n 9) 170. 
65 Brandon Marc Higa, ‘Japan’s Anti-Conspiracy Law: Relinquishing Japan’s Civil Liberties in the 
Name of Global Counterterrorism Efforts’ (2017) 19 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 201, 214. 
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organization of crime” (the Bill).66 Though the main content has been the same as the 
current Anti-conspiracy law, the Bill was not explained by the government as a counter-
terrorism measure. Instead, the government explained the need to enact the Bill only with 
relation to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC).67 This multilateral treaty was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 
of 15 November 2000, aiming at fighting against transnational organized crime.68 This 
treaty opened for signature by Member States in Palermo in 2000.69 Article 5(1) of the 
UNCTOC mentions as below:70  
 
Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group  
 
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:  
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the 
attempt or completion of the criminal activity:  
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose 
relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit 
and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the 
participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;  
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal 
activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in 
question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her 
                                                 
66 Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 126. 
67 see ibid. 
68 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto’ (United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2019) <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html> 
accessed 17 August 2019. 
69 ibid. 
70 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2001 (A/RES/55/25). 
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participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim; 
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of 
serious crime involving an organized criminal group.  
 
Article 5(1) of the UNCTOC requires signatory countries to criminalize either 
conspiracy act as mentions in (a) or participation in an organized criminal group as 
mentions in (b) or both of these acts. The Japanese government explained that the 
Penal Code of Japan did not have articles code to criminalize these activities and the 
Anti-conspiracy Bill needed to be passed to fulfill Japan’s obligation to the U.N. as a 
signatory state to a multilateral treaty.71 
 
(2)  Opposition from the JFBA about submitting the Bill to the National Diet 
When noticing that the Japanese government was planning to submit the Bill to the 
National Diet in 2003, the Japanese Federation of Bar Association (JFBA) strongly 
opposed to the Bill. The JFBA is a federal body, where all attorneys, legal professional 
corporations, and registered foreign lawyers in Japan should register.72 The JFBA publish 
opinion papers and statements based on its duty to protect human rights and realize 
social justice.73 Noticing that the Bill had the potential risk of human rights violation, on 
January 20, 2003, the JFBA published an opinion paper in Japanese titled “an opinion 
paper about a new domestic legislation based on the UNCTOC”74.  
 
                                                 
71 see Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 126. 
72 JFBA, ‘Nihonn Bengoshi Rengokai [The JFBA]: Membership’ (23 August 2019) 
<https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/us/profile/membership.html> accessed 23 August 
2019. 
73 JFBA, ‘Nihonn Bengoshi Rengokai [The JFBA]：What Is the JFBA?’ 
<https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/us/profile.html> accessed 14 September 2019. 
74 JFBA, ‘Kokuren “ekkyo soshiki hanzai bousi zyoyaku” teiketu ni tomonau kokunai houseibi 
nikannsuru ikennsyo [An opinion paper about a new domestic legislation based on the 
UNCTOC]’(JFBA, ２０January2003). 
17 
 
In its opinion paper, the JFBA criticized that the Bill was beyond the scope of the 
UNCTOC.75 Article 3 of the UNCTOC prescribes that the scope of the Convention was 
“where the offence is transitional in nature and involves an organized criminal group.”76 
However, the Bill did not have any limitation in terms of its scope and it was applicable 
not only transnational offenses but also any purely domestic offenses.77 
                                          
(3) Failure of the first attempt to enact the Bill  
Despite strong opposition from the JFBA, the government did not stop its effort to enact 
the Bill and the Bill was submitted to the House of Representatives in the National 
Diet.78 Nevertheless, the Bill was shelved without any discussion in the House due to 
a dissolution of the House.79 Article 7(3) of the Constitution of Japan prescribes that 
the cabinet has the power to dissolve the House of Representatives under the name 
of the Emperor.80 The Prime Minister, as a leader of the cabinet, has the power to 
decide when to dissolve the House.81 After a dissolution, an election for the  House 
follows.82 Thus, when the Prime Minister considers there is a better chance of winning 
an election for the House, he is more likely to decide the dissolution.83 
Junichiro Koizumi, the Prime Minister at that time, decided to dissolve the Parliament 
in October 2003 taking into consideration the winning chance of the following 
                                                 
75 ibid 2–3. 
76 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (n 68). 
77 JFBA, ‘Kokuren “ekkyo soshiki hanzai bousi zyoyaku” teiketu ni tomonau kokunai houseibi nikannsuru 
ikennsyo [An opinion paper about a new domestic legislation based on the UNCTOC]’ (n 74) 1–2. 
78 see Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 126. 
79 ibid. 
80 nihonkoku kenpou [The Constitution of Japan] (adopted November 3 1946, entered into force 
May 3 1947). 
81 Nakasaki Taro, ‘syuin kaisan, syusyouha naze dekiruno? itikarakeisetu: asahishinbun dezitalu 
[Why can the Prime Minister dissolve the Lower House?: Asahi newspaper degital]’ (Asahi 
newspaper digital, 28 September 2017) 
<https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK9X55XHK9XUTFK011.html> accessed 14 September 2019. 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
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election.84 Mr. Koizumi may have given priority to winning the election over passing the 
Bill thinking he could submit and pass the Bill in the next Diet. As Mr. Koizumi foresaw, 
the election ended up winning the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), where the Prime 
Minister belonged.85  
 
2. The second attempt by the government and its failure 
(1)  The second attempt by the government to enact the Bill 
The ruling party submitted "a Bill to amend a part of Penal Code to manage the 
globalization and organization of crime" (the Bill) in the National Diet in July 2005.86 The 
submission of the Bill was not surprising considering the ruling party won the election 
in 2003 and there was no discussion about the Bill in the previous Diet. The name and 
the content did not change at all from the previous bill.87  
 
(2)  Opposition from opposition parties in the National Diet 
In the National Diet, the opposition parties such as the Democratic Party of Japan 
strongly opposed the Bill and there was a huge discussion in the Diet.88 Through its 
discussion, the opposition Parties succeeded to reveal many problematic issues in the 
new anti-conspiracy Bill.  
First point was, as the JFBA mentioned in its opposing paper in 2003, that the scope 
of the Bill was broader than the requirement by Article 5 of the UNCTOC.89  The 
opposition Parties succeeded to clarify this problem more by taking a religious group 
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as an example.90 Article 1 (a) of the UNCTOC defines an "organized criminal group" 
and it requires the group to "in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit."91 Thus, the organized group purely for religious aim is out of the 
scope of the treaty because these groups do not have aim of obtaining any financial or 
other material benefit.92 On the other hand, the Bill did not have any limitation clause 
about the aim and hence, and the Bill would be applicable for these religious groups.93 
More fundamentally, the opposition parties criticized the Bill would cause a massive 
surveillance society due to difficulty of collective evidence94 Consider a murder case 
for example. When the crime is accomplished, the victim is already dead and some 
tools for killing the victim may have already been used. Then, collective evidence from 
the dead body or these tools might be possible. On the other hand, at the stag of 
conspiracy, suspects may not have bought a knife yet because this Bill would 
criminalize acts at the stage of conspiracy, which is much earlier than real attempt of 
crimes. Therefore, the main evidence for proving conspiracy would be daily 
communication among suspects.95 In order to collect enough evidence from these 
communications, police need to monitor daily communications such as telephones and 
emails among not only potential terrorists but also ordinary people because no one 
knows when ordinary people become dangerous people.96  
 
(3) The second failure by the government to enact the Bill 
The issues raised by the opposition parties were so controversial in the National Diet 
that the ruling party failed to reach a vote stage of the Bill. In Japan, it is regarded that 
in order to go to a stage of voting a bill, not only the ruling party but also opposition 
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parties should agree in the Diet.97 Based on the principle, the ruling party had to spend 
much time on explaining the Bill and before exhausting the discussion, in August 2005, 
there came up another huge issue, privatization of the postal services. Mr. Junichiro 
Koizumi, the Prime Minister at that time, considered the issue of the postal services as 
the heart of his reform of the nation.98 Thus, when the bill related to the privatization of 
the postal services was defeated in the House of Councilors, Mr. Koizumi decided to 
dissolve the House of Representatives.99 Mr. Koizumi said he would like to have an 
opportunity to ask the people for their judgment whether the privatization of the postal 
services should be approved or not by having an election. 100  Thus, the Bill was 
abandoned again in August 2005 before the Bill was entered into a voting stage.101  
 
3. The third attempt by the government and its failure 
(1)  The third attempt by the government to enact the Bill 
An election due to dissolution in August 2005 ended up massive win of the ruling 
party, LDP.102 Then, as the third attempt, the Japanese government submitted the 
same Bill as the previous one in September 2005.103 This continuous attempts to 
enact an Anti-conspiracy law shows the persistence of the government to enact the 
Bill.  
 
(2)  Opposition from the JFBA and locals  
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This time, again, the JFBA strongly opposed to the Bill. The JFBA criticized the 
criminalizing of an act of conspiracy that did not consist of principles of the Japanese 
domestic law.104 The Bill would make it possible to punish more than 600 crimes at 
the stage of conspiracy, which are far prior stage to preparations.105 Considering the 
Penal Code of Japan, attempts or preparations are punishable only for exceptional 
cases, the JFBA pointed out this new Bill would change and deteriorate the whole 
system of criminal procedure.106  
This criticism may be persuasive in that the Japanese government surprisingly 
mentioned this point before the adoption of the UNCTOC. In travaux preparations, 
the Japanese government once mentioned: “it is inconsistent with our legal principle 
to criminalize the acts of conspiracy and preparation of all serious crimes.”107 The 
reason that the government radically changed its position and decided to ratify the 
treaty remains unknown yet shocking. 
 
Unlike the previous two times, this time, not only legal experts but also many 
Japanese ordinary local people opposed to the Bill due to raising awareness about 
the danger of the Bill.108 This time, some academics pointed out the similarities 
between the Maintenance of Public Order Act and the Bill and local Japanese people 
feared the Bill would give abusive power to police, causing severe human rights 
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abuse targeting ordinary people.109 As shown in the first half of this chapter, there 
was hatred against the notorious Maintenance of Public Order Act. This negative 
image may have triggered Japanese people to oppose the Bill.  
 
(3) Abandonment of enacting the Bill 
In 2006, the Bill was abandoned before it went to the stage of voting.110The hatred 
against the abusive power may be the main reason that the government failed to enact 
the Bill.111 It is said that the ruling party did not go to a stage of voting because, Junichiro 
Koizumi, the Prime Minister at that time, did not want to be remembered as a notorious 
Prime Minister, who enacted a new version of the Maintenance of Public Order Act.112  
 
III. Enactment of the Anti-conspiracy law and analysis about concern raised by a UN rapporteur  
 
A. The process of succeeding enactment of the Anti-conspiracy law 
1. The government’s problematic explanation about the Bill 
(1) The government changed the abbreviated name of the Bill without changing its content  
In this section, this essay tries to reveal how the Japanese government succeeded to 
enact the Anti-conspiracy law in 2017 despite strong opposition as shown in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Opposition about the Anti-conspiracy Bill showed that there was a notorious image about 
the name of anti-conspiracy among Japanese people because of the Maintenance of the 
Public Order Act, which was enacted during World War II. Noticing the negative image, 
this time, the government stopped to call the Bill as an anti-conspiracy bill and instead 
called as “the Offence to Criminalize an Act in Furtherance of Planning to Commit 
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Terrorism and Other Serious Crimes.” 113 By putting “Terrorism” in its name, the 
government emphasized that the Bill was against terrorism and hence there was no risk 
of human rights violation toward ordinal people. The government repeatedly explained 
that ordinary people were out of the target of the Bill.114 
 
However, the content that the Bill criminalizes at the stage of conspiracy was not changed 
at all. As shown from local opposition about the Bill, there remained much risk that 
ordinary people would be under massive surveillance under the name of counter-
terrorism.115  
 
(2) The government emphasized terrorist aspects though the UNCTOC is not against 
terrorism 
In addition, this time, the government changed its reason for proposing the Bill. One 
of the main two reasons proposed by the government this time was to improve 
security ahead of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games.116 This reasoning 
was proposed for the first time in the Government’s efforts of the Anti-conspiracy 
Bill.117 Based on the government’s explanation, numerous terrorist attacks happen all 
over the world these days.118 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insisted on the necessity of 
enacting the Act in order to preserve Japan's reputation as the safest country.119 
However, as the JFBA revealed, Japan may have already enough measures to 
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combat terrorisms by ratifying 13 relevant treaties about counter-terrorisms.120 
Considering the fact, questions remain whether there was a need to enact a new law.  
 
The other reason proposed by the Japanese government was to ratify the UNCTOC. 
Same as previous times, the government explained that it would be essential for Japan 
to enact the Anti-conspiracy law to become a State Party of the UNCTOC.121 However, 
unlike the previous three times, the government emphasized terrorist aspects and 
explained the UNCTOC as a counter-terrorism treaty.122 The government explained 
that becoming a State Party of the UNCTOC would enable Japan to protect its country 
from terrorisms.123 However, the UNCTOC was not intended to prevent terrorisms.124 
While the United Nation Office of Counter-Terrorism officially publishes a list of 19 
universal treaties dealing with terrorism, UNCTOC is not included in the list. 125 
Moreover, UNODC mentions some countries insisted that UNCTOC should be placed 
as a counter-terrorism measure, but, in the end, this opinion was not approved and 
UNCTOC was separated from the counter-terrorist measures. 126  The legislative 
guideline also explicitly mentions that groups such as some terrorist or insurgent 
groups, provided that their goals were purely non-material, would not be covered in the 
Convention.127 By emphasizing the terrorist aspect, the government may have tried to 
                                                 
120 JFBA, ‘Iwayuru Kyobozaiwo Sousetusuru Houannwo Kokkaini Zyouteisurukotoni Hanntaisuru 
Ikennsyo [Opinion Opposing the Submission of the Bill to Criminalize Conspiracy to the Diet]’ 
(JFBA, 17 February 2017)8. 
121 Higa (n 65). 
122 see Takayama (n 3) 35–44. 
123 see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (n 3). 
124 Hiraoka and Kaido (n 25) 52. 
125 UN, ‘UNITED NATIONS Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT)’ 
<https://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml> accessed 3 August 2019. 
126 Koike, Yonekura and Yamada (n 14) 185. 
127 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Legislative Guide for the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto’ para 26 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf>
. 
25 
 
avoid criticism from local people leading to think they were out of the target of the Bill.128  
 
(3)  The government explained the scope of the Bill was limited but remained broad 
As response to previous criticism that the scope of the previous Bill covered was too 
broad, the Japanese government limited its scope from over 600 to 277 crimes.129 
The government explained that there was no risk of human rights violation  by limiting 
its scope of the Bill.130  
However, limiting the scope of the Bill does not automatically guarantee the limitation 
is appropriate. Under the current Penal Code in Japan, there is no provision of 
conspiracy crime.131 Moreover, though the Code criminalizes some acts at the stage 
of plots, which is regarded as almost the same stage as conspiracy, this 
criminalization is limited to only a few crimes, while the number of criminalization of 
accomplished is over 200.132 The vast gap of the number of criminalization between 
at the stage of plots and accomplishments shows the criminalization at the stage of 
plot is highly exceptional.133 Thus, criminalizing 277 acts at the stage of conspiracy 
under the Bill may change the whole system of criminal system by expanding its 
punishable act drastically. 
  
2. Concern raised by a UN Special Rapporteur and reaction of the government 
(1)  Concern from a UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy 
Widespread protests and opposition about the Anti-conspiracy Bill caught the attention of 
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the United Nations.134 Mr. Joseph Cannataci, a UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
privacy noticed the potential risk of human rights violation and raised serious concerns 
about the anti-conspiracy Bill by sending a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister on 18 
May 2017.135 This letter published on the website of the UN Human Rights Office of the 
High Commissioner.136 After the Rapporteur raised various concerns about the Bill, the 
Rapporteur mentioned the Bill, if enacted into law, may lead to undue restrictions to the 
rights to privacy and freedom of expression because of its broad scope.137 The fact that 
not only Japanese people but also international society had serious concern about the 
Bill was shocking and a lot of mass media reported the news.138  
 
(2)  The Government’s shameful reaction about the letter  
The response of the Government about Mr. Cannataci’s letter may have been far 
from ideal. Without considering the concerns sincerely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan published a protest toward OHCHR on the same day of the publication of 
the letter.139 In its protest, the Ministry criticized Mr. Cannataci mentioning the letter 
should not have been published in the name of the Special rapporteur of the United 
Nations.140 Moreover, the Ministry condemned that the letter was released unilaterally 
without involvement of the Japanese government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.141 
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Insisting there was no opportunity to explain the content of the legislation to the 
Rapporteur directly and hence, the Ministry concluded the letter was unbalanced and 
inappropriate.142  
Moreover, one day later, Katsutoshi Kaneda, the Minister of Justice at that time, 
criticized the letter by saying that Special rapporteurs do not reflect the UN’s position 
and that the letter appeared to have written without sufficient understanding the 
Bill.143 It is without saying that Special rapporteurs are individual experts, but the 
Minister seemed deliberately emphasized the point under the intention of 
understating the importance of the letter.144  
The evaluation of the response of the government may well be drawn by Mr. 
Cannataci’s reaction. Mr. Cannataci characterized the government’s criticism as 
“angry words” with “no substance”.145 Though Mr. Cannataci would have welcomed 
gaining more information about the Bill, the government did not provide any useful 
information.146  
 
3. Enactment of the Anti-conspiracy law by unusual procedures 
(1) The ruling party rammed the Bill through the House of Representative 
The Bill was passed through a highly unusual step. In Japan, a bill becomes law after 
voting passage by two Houses in the National Diet, namely the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councilors.147 In each House, as a matter of 
practice, it is regarded that not only the ruling party but also opposition parties should 
agree to go to a stage of voting a Bill.148 This practice is based on the idea that under 
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democracy, derivative discussion should be exhausted.149 Most of Japanese current 
laws have been enacted through voting after this agreement.150 However, this time, 
the ruling party rammed the Bill through the House of Representatives even though 
the opposition parties requested more discussion.151 This aggressive attitude of the 
ruling party was far from preferable because they did not respect democracy and 
neglected their duty to give a detailed explanation about the Bill.  
 
(2) The ruling party used a highly unusual bypass tactic in the House of Councilors 
Aggressive attitude of the ruling party did not stop in the House of Representatives. In 
the House of Councilors, a bill is first discussed in a Committee such as Committee on 
Judicial Affairs, and Committee on Foreign Affairs.152 There are seventeen Committees 
under the House in total and each member of the House of Councilors belong to at 
least one Committee.153 Each Committee has its specialization and a bill can be 
discussed in detail from its specialized perspective.154 In ordinal procedure, after 
passing a vote in a Committee, a bill is sent to the House of Councilors, where a floor 
vote is held.155 About the Anti-conspiracy law, the Bill was sent to a Committee on 
Judicial Affairs, where severe discussion was held.156 Surprisingly, the ruling party 
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skipped a vote in the Upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs in the middle of the 
discussion.157 Though there is a tactic that skips a vote in the Upper House Committee 
on Judicial Affairs, Japanese legislators regard that the committee bypass tactic should 
not be used easily because this would lose its significance of a Committee.158 
Therefore, only when a chairperson in a Committee belongs to the opposing parties 
and discussion in the Committee was deliberately delayed due to his or her political 
reasons, the bypass tactic has been used in order to break through the delay under 
exceptional cases.159 This time, the chairperson belonged to the Komeito, which was a 
coalition party with the ruling party, LDP, and there was no abusive delay of discussion 
in the Committee.160 Thus, despite there was no reasonable need, the government 
used the bypass tactics to avoid opposition by the Judicial Affairs committee members, 
who were anticipated to strike down the bill.161  
 
(3) Enact of the Anti-conspiracy law  
After skipping the vote in the Committee, the Bill was sent to a floor vote. Thus, the 
Bill was passed within days of the 2017 Diet Session and the Bill was enacted in 
2017.162 
 
Enactment of the Anti-conspiracy law was criticized by locals not only because of its 
content but also because of its use of unusual tactics. The opposing parties criticized 
the ruling party did not give sufficient opportunity to discuss the Bill.163 Even a 
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member of the LDP criticized the bypass tactic by mentioning using this tactic could 
lose the significance of the Committee.164 Moreover, the JFBA immediately published 
a statement about the Anti-conspiracy law.165 In its statement, the JFBA also criticized 
the use of skipping a vote in the Upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs.166 
Moreover, the JFBA mentioned there is a concern that general citizens can be 
exposed to massive surveillance.167 Other locals also had suspicions about the 
government's attitude. One survey in one of the most famous newspaper in Japan 
revealed that majority of the respondent felt the Diet should not have enacted the 
Anti-conspiracy law.168 Therefore, the Anti-conspiracy law was enacted without 
adequate support and understanding from locals.  
 
B.  Analysis of the problems of the anti-conspiracy Act raised by Mr. Cannataci under Article 9 of 
the ICCPR 
 
1. The meaning of Article 9 of the ICCPR 
(1) The framework of Article 9 of the ICCPR  
In this section, this essay tries to reveal problems of the Anti-conspiracy law under an 
international legal framework. Mr. Joseph Cannataci, a UN Special Rapporteur on the 
right to privacy, raised concern about the Anti-conspiracy law by mentioning that adding 
227 crimes in attachment as a form of Appendix makes it difficult for citizens and experts 
to understand the scope of the law.169 Moreover, Mr. Cannataci raised concern that the 
                                                 
164 ‘Ruling Coalition Diverts Attention from Scandal by Ramming “conspiracy” Bill into Law’ (n 
156). 
165 JFBA, ‘Statement on the Enactment of the Bill to Revise the Act on Punishment of Organized 
Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, Including the Criminalization of Conspiracy’ (JFBA, 15 June 
2017) <https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/170615.html> accessed 4 
October 2019. 
166 ibid. 
167 ibid. 
168 Higa (n 65) 217. 
169 Cannataci (n 30). 
31 
 
definition of what an “organized crime” is vague.170 Mr. Cannataci does not quote any 
articles when mentioning these points, and thus, this essay tries to clarify this problem 
with reference to Article 9 of the ICCPR. Article 9 (1) ICCPR prescribes as below171: 
  
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
 
As the Human Rights Committee mentions, the first paragraph of Article 9(1) is applicable 
to all types of deprivations of liberty.172 The Anti-conspiracy law is under restriction of the 
article because this law enables to arrest and detain suspects in custody, which causes 
deprivation of liberty. However, the right to liberty of person is not regarded as absolute.173 
Thus, under Article 9 (1), not all detention is prohibited nor preventive detention itself is 
prohibited.174 Then, whether the anti-conspiracy Act is permissible depends on whether 
it falls within the prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention under Article 9 (1) of the 
ICCPR. 175  From this point, in the next paragraph, the word "arbitrary arrest and 
detention" needs to be clarified. 
 
(2) The elements of judging ‘arbitrary' in Article 9 (1) of the ICCPR 
As shown in the third sentence of Article 9 (1), when the detention is carried out in a way 
that is not respectful of law, this will be automatically arbitrary detention. However, 
arbitrariness must be interpreted more broadly. Travaux Preparatoire of the Article 9 of 
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the ICCPR shows the word “arbitrary” was included because the majority of the members 
of the Commission had considered that “the rule of law did not provide adequate 
safeguards against the possible promulgation of unjust laws”.176  
Moreover, in Mukong v Cameroon, the UN Human Rights Committee explained 
‘arbitrariness’ is not equated with ‘against the law’, but must be interpreted to include 
elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.177 
Similarly, in No.35 General Comment, the Committee states the notion of arbitrary 
includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process 
of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality. 178 
Therefore, these elements are core principles of the arbitrary arrest and detention. 
However, more clarification for elements might be needed to analysis the Anti-conspiracy 
law.  
 
(3) More clarification about the element of predictability 
Mr. Cannataci mentioned the Anti-conspiracy law may be difficult for citizens and experts 
to understand.179 This comment may relate an element of predictability, and thus, in this 
paragraph, this essay focuses on an element of ‘predictability’. Both No. 8 and No.35 
General Comments does not explicitly clarify the meaning of ‘predictability’. However, in 
the No.35 General Comment, the UN Human Rights Committee mentioned that any 
substantive grounds for arrest or detention must be defined with sufficient precision to 
avoid overly broad or arbitrary interpretation or application. 180  In other words, it is 
considered that predictability is included in the elements of the ‘arbitrary detention’ in order 
to avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation and implementation of the law.181 Considering 
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these, the term ‘lack of predictability’ may refer to vagueness of the wording of the law.182  
 
However, not only the precision of the wording but also the structure of a law may be 
important for predictability. When the structure of a law is so complex that individual has 
difficulty understanding the scope of a law, he or she may not be able to foresee whether 
his or her conduct would cause punishment under the law. This should be also considered 
lack of predictability because the word “predictability” is consistent with this interpretation. 
Though this interpretation is not explicitly mentioned in No.8 and No.35 General 
Comments, this may be justified with reference to a comment by the Human Rights 
Committee in No. 34 General Comment, which mentions about the freedom of speech.183 
As Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR shows, the restriction of the freedom of speech must be 
‘provided by law’184. About the meaning of the word, the Committee mentions law must be 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct 
accordingly.185 This comment shows the significance of foreseeability for an individual’s 
act. Though this comment is for the different article, this significance may be the same 
under Article 9 considering both articles require restriction must be provided ‘by law’. Thus, 
when a structure of a law is so complex that it prevents from understanding a law, the law 
does not meet an element of predictability. Enough simplicity of the structure of a law may 
be needed for predictability.  
 
2. Analysis of the concerns raised by Mr. Cannataci 
(1) Article 6, Appendix3 and Appendix 4 of the Anti-conspiracy law 
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In this section, this essay analysis whether the Anti-conspiracy law breaches Article 9 of 
the ICCPR focusing on the element of predictability. Before analyzing, the structure of 
the Anti-conspiracy law needs to be explained. Article 6(2) of the Act prescribes the scope 
of punishable acts186: 
 
Two or more persons who plan, as part of activities of terrorist groups or other organized 
criminal groups (a group of persons whose common purpose is to carry out the crimes 
enumerated in Appendix 3), the commission of criminal acts listed in the following 
sections by such groups, are subject to the punishment prescribed in each of those 
sections, if any of them have arranged funds or goods or carried out preliminary 
inspections of relevant locations pursuant to the plan or other preparatory acts for the 
purpose of committing the planned criminal acts.  
(i) Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by death penalty or indefinite 
imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for more than 10 years- 
imprisonment with o without labor for 5 years or less 
(ii) Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by either imprisonment with 
or without labor for more than 4 years but less than 10 years- Imprisonment with or 
without labor for 2 years or less.  
 
 Article 6 (2) of the Anti-conspiracy law quotes both Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 in its article. 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 prescribe as below187: 
 
Appendix3 
(1) An act prescribed in Article3(Organized Homicide), Article 9 (1) to (3) (An act obtaining 
profit by corporations in order to control their management), Article 10(1) (Concealment 
of criminal proceeds) or Article 11 (Acceptance of criminal proceeds) 
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(2) (i) The crimes prescribed in Article 77 (1) of the Penal Code (Insurrection) (excluding 
Article 77 (1) (iii)) or Article 79 of the Penal Code (Accessoryship to Insurrection) 
(excluding Article 79 (limited to Article 79 (3)) and Article 77 (2))  
(ii) The crimes prescribed in Article 81 (Instigation of Foreign Aggression) or Article 82 
(Assistance to the Enemy) of the Penal Code 
…  
 
Appendix 4 
(1) The act set forth in Appendix 3 (excluding the acts in the following) 
(a) An act prescribed in Article 11 (Acceptance of Criminal Proceeds) 
(b) An act prescribed in Article 77 in the Penal code (excluding the parts in Article 77 
(3)), Article 81, Article 82 and Article 198 
(c) an act prescribed in Article 1 of the Criminal Regulations to Control Explosives 
(Criminal Use of Explosives) 
(d) an act prescribed in Article 60 (2) Child Welfare Act (limited to Article 34(1)(vii) or 
(viiii)) 
…. 
(2) An act prescribed in Article 7 (limited to Article7 (1)(a) to (c)) 
… 
 
(2) Complexity of the structure of the Anti-conspiracy law 
This essay tries to reveal the complexity of the Anti-conspiracy by taking an act of 
accessoryship to insurrection for example. Consider ten people become a group and 
plan to help a riot leader, whose purpose is to overthrow the government, by 
supplying food.  
First, in order to understand whether this act is punishable, whether the group of ten 
members is regarded as ‘terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups’ must be 
analyzed. In Article 6 (2) of the Anti-conspiracy law, the term ‘terrorist groups or other 
organized criminal groups’ is prescribed as ‘a group of persons whose common 
purpose is to carry out the crimes enumerated in Appendix 3’. Then, as shown above, 
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Appendix 3 lists punishable acts. An act of ‘accessoryship to insurrection’ is 
prescribed in Article 79 of the Penal Code, which is included in the list of Appendix 3. 
Article 79 of the Penal Code prescribes188: 
 
A person who aids the commission of any of the crimes prescribed under the 
preceding two Articles by the supply of arms, funds or food, or by any other act, shall 
be punished by imprisonment without work for not more than 7 years. 
 
Article 79 quotes ‘the preceding two Articles’, and hence one must go to these two 
articles to understand whether the group of two people is under the regulation of 
Article 79. Article 77 (1) of the Penal Code prescribes189;  
 
A person who commits an act of riot for the purpose of overthrowing the government, 
usurping the territorial sovereignty of the State, or otherwise subverting constitutional 
order, thereby committing the crime of insurrection shall be sentenced according to 
the following distinctions: 
(i) A ringleader shall be punished by death or life imprisonment without work; 
(ii) A person who participates in a plot or directs a mob shall be punished by 
imprisonment without work either for life or for a definite term of not less than 3 years; 
a person who performs other leading functions shall be punished by imprisonment 
without work for not less than 1 year but not more than 10 years; 
… 
The group members in the example plan to supply food to a riot leader. The leader is 
within the scope of “a ringleader”, “who commits an act of riot for the purpose of 
overthrowing the government”, which is prescribed in Article 77 (1) (i) and supplying 
food is prescribed in the Article 79 of the Penal Code. Thus, these group members in 
the example is punishable under Article 79. Therefore, the ten members are within 
the definition of ‘terrorist groups or other organized criminal group’. 
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This example may reveal the issue of the structure of the Anti-conspiracy is deeper 
than Mr. Cannataci thought. It is true that Article 6 (2) and Appendix 3 and Appendix 
4 are put in different places. An individual must look at these three different articles to 
understand the scope of punishable acts because while Appendix 3 defines the 
scope of terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups, Appendix 4 prescribes 
the punishable acts by listing crimes. However, more importantly, Appendix 4 itself 
may be hard to understand even for legal experts because of many excluding and 
limiting clauses. Moreover, as shown in the hypothetical example, in most cases, one 
must go to not only Appendix 3 and 4 of the Anti-conspiracy law but also other laws 
such as the Penal Code in order to understand whether his or her conduct is within 
the definition of ‘terrorist groups or other criminal groups’.190 This procedure may 
require a high knowledge of laws and it may be difficult for an ordinal individual to 
predict whether his or her conduct is punishable under the Anti-conspiracy law. 
Therefore, this complexity of the Anti-conspiracy law may breach Article 9 (1) of the 
ICCPR because it lacks predictability.  
 
(3) Vagueness of the word “terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups” 
Then, in the following paragraphs, this essay tries to analysis the second concern by Mr. 
Cannataci, which was the vagueness of “organized crime”. However, Mr. Cannataci may 
have picked up a partial part. The actual words were “terrorist groups or other organized 
criminal groups" as shown in Article 6(2) of the Anti-conspiracy law and these words 
should not be separated. And considering the law was against terrorism based on the 
government's explanation, "terrorist groups" should be put more emphasis. Thus, this 
essay analysis weather "terrorist groups" is prescribed with sufficient precision.  
 
First, surprisingly, though Article 6 (2) prescribes “terrorist groups”, there is no definition 
of the term within the Anti-conspiracy law. This itself may cause vagueness of the word 
“terrorist groups or other organized criminal group.” With this regard, some may argue 
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that by reference to international law, it is possible to understand the definition of ‘terrorist 
group’ in the law. To be sure, there are numerous ‘sector'-specific treaties that address 
particular crime means or methods used by terrorists.191 However, none of these specific 
treaties has a comprehensive definition of terrorism despite the fact numerous efforts by 
the international community have been put since the 1920s.192 In the lack of a general 
approved definition of terrorism in treaty laws, no parallel customary rule can arise out of 
those treaties.193 Therefore, it is impossible to deduce the definition by reference to 
international law.  
 
Some Japanese academics argue that the definition of the term ‘terrorist group’ is 
possible by reference to domestic laws.194 To be sure, some Japanese domestic laws 
have a definition of the term "terrorism". For example, under Act on the Protection of 
Specially Designated Secrets, in Article 12 (2)(i) terrorism is defined as below195: 
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any terrorist activities (meaning activities intended to kill or injure people or destroy 
important facilities or other objects for the purpose of forcing a 
political or other principle or belief upon the State or other persons or causing 
fear or terror in society based on such principle or opinion; the same shall apply 
in item (iv) of the same table) 
 
This definition of “terrorist activity” is the same as in another law, which prohibits drone 
around the House of Parliament and other important facilities. 196  However, an 
individual may have difficulty finding the definition because there is no clue in the Anti-
conspiracy law that the word “terrorist groups” are prescribed in other laws. Moreover, 
in Japan, a definition in one law is not automatically applied in another law. One of 
these examples is the definition of “worker”. In Japan, under Article 9 of the Labor 
Standard Act, “workers” are defined as “one who is employed at a business or office 
and receives Wages therefrom, regardless of the type of occupation”.197 On the other 
hand, under Article 3 of the Labor Union Act, "Workers" are defined as “those persons 
who live on their wages, salaries, or other equivalent income, regardless of the kind of 
occupation.198 " While under the Labor Standard Act, an element of employment is 
required, under the Labor Union Act, such element is not required. Thus, it is regarded 
the definition of "workers" under the Labor Union Act is wider than that of the Labor 
Standard Act.199 Similarly, even though “terrorist activity” is prescribed in different laws, 
there is no guarantee the definition is applied to the Anti-conspiracy law.  
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More fundamentally, applying the definition of the word of the Act on the Protection of 
Specially Designated Secrets into the Anti-conspiracy law may contradict the 
explanation by the government. As shown above, the government explained the reason 
for enacting the anti-conspiracy Act was to ratify UNCTOC, which excludes terrorisms 
purely motivated by political or religious reasons from its scope of the Convention.200 
On the other hand, as shown in the definition under Article 12(2)(i) of the Act on the 
Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, the Act does not exclude these reasons 
from its definition.201 Thus, it is not certain whether terrorisms purely motivated by 
political or religious reasons would be under the scope of the Anti-conspiracy law or 
not. This vagueness may give undesirable discretion to polices about judgment 
weather an activity falls under the definition of “terrorist groups or other organized 
criminal groups”.  Therefore, the Anti-conspiracy law may breach Article 9 (1) of the 
ICCPR because of insufficient precision of the word “terrorist group or other criminal 
groups”. 
 
IV. Problems of the Anti-conspiracy law by reference to discussion of the United 
Kingdom’s practice and United States’ practice 
A. Analysis of the problems of the Anti-conspiracy law with reference to the United Kingdom’s 
practice 
1. History of the United Kingdom’s preventive detention framework 
(1)  Preventive detention to Northern Ireland terrorism 
In the first half of this chapter, this essay tries to reveal problems of the Anti-conspiracy 
law with reference to the shift of the United Kingdom's preventive detention framework. 
To understand the shift, first, a brief history of preventive detention framework in the 
United Kingdom needs to be looked through. 
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The United Kingdom has longstanding experience combating terrorism within its territory. 
In 1972, the United Kingdom government adopted preventive detention as a measure 
against Northern Ireland terrorism.202 At that time, there was a conflict between the 
Catholic republicans in Ulster seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of 
Ireland and Protestants opposed Irish unification. 203  Under the law, any person 
suspected of having been concerned in the commission of terrorism could be detained 
for 28 days. 204  After that, the detainee was either released or referred to a 
Commissioner.205 The Commissioner would hear the case, but the hearing was not a 
judicial procedure but an executive one.206  
It is widely believed that the introduction of internment without trial in Northern Ireland 
was a failure because it only served to worsen the situation by causing further alienation 
of the Catholic community, an increase in support for and membership of the IRA and an 
overall increase in the level of violence.207 
 
(2) Adoption of Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act after 9.11 terrorist attack 
The devastating terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, 
made the United Kingdom take stronger measures against terrorism. 208  On 14 
December 2001, the United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act became 
a law (hereafter ATCSA).209 Part 4 of the ATCSA granted the Home Secretary the 
power to certify foreign nationals who were terrorist suspects.210 This power might be 
controversial in that reasonable belief and suspicion of the Home Secretary may be 
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based on secret evidence. 211  Moreover, while the judicial body has the power to 
confirm this executive opinion, detained people and their counsel may be excluded 
from the hearings.212 
Once an individual had been certified through this problematic process, he or she could 
be repatriated.213 Under Article 23 of the ACTSA, if, on the other hand, his or her home 
country conditions were such that upon repatriation the individual might face torture or 
other forms of ill-treatment, he or she could be detained until such conditions changed 
or until another country is willing to receive him or her.214  
 
In order to fully implement the ATSCA, it was necessary to derogate from Article 5(1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.215 Article 15 of the convention allows 
State Parties to derogate a certain number of their human rights obligations "in time of 
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation"216. It was highly 
debatable whether the 9.11 attack would meet the requirement of the “threat the life of 
the nation” considering the attack happened outside of the United Kingdom. 217 
However, the United Kingdom implemented derogation and the prerequisite for full 
implementation for the ACTSA was met.218  
 
Originally, Article 23 of the ACTSA was intended to prohibit the extradition of individuals 
to countries in which they would face a real risk of torture, the death penalty, or any 
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other inhuman or degrading treatment.219 However, the United Kingdom made use of 
this article for detaining suspected terrorists potentially indefinitely by insisting they 
may face torture or other forms of ill-treatment in their home countries.220 This system 
enabled to detain non-national suspected of involvement with terrorism without charge 
or trial.221 Based on Elias’s taxonomy, this detention system is categorized as the 
immigration detention framework in that the system anchors its immigration law 
system.222 Under this ATCSA provision, in three years, a seventeen were certified, 
sixteen of whom were detained.223  
 
(3) The shift from immigration framework into pre-trial detention model 
The immigration detention system under the ATCSA in the United Kingdom did not 
last for a long time. A former home secretary, Charles Clarke, criticized the ATCSA 
by mentioning the governing legislation relating to detention without charge was 
being applied in a ‘disproportionate and discriminatory manner’ against non-British 
citizens.224  
Moreover, detained people challenged the lawfulness of their detention before the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission(SIAC) because this was the only way of 
challenging the Home Secretary’s certification.225 In July 2002, the SIAC granted a 
declaration the detentions were incompatible with Article 5 and 14 of the ECHR in 
that they permitted detention of suspected international terrorists in a way that they 
discriminated against them on the ground of nationality.226 This declaration was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal, which held that there were objective and 
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justifiable grounds for selecting only non-British citizens for detention.227After that, the 
case was brought before the House of Lords. In its opinion, while eight of the nine 
Law Lords justified the derogation made by the government, the majority also ruled 
the indefinite detention without trial of foreign terrorists suspects violated the right to 
liberty in that this derogating measure was not strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation.228 Moreover, the House of Lords held that Part 4 of the ACTSA 
breached the prohibition of discrimination, which was prescribed in Article 14 of the 
ECHR, because the section provides detention only for foreign people, and the 
difference was not reasonably justifiable.229  
Consequently, the government needed to change the ATCSA into a new framework, 
which is equally applicable to foreign and Britain citizens. 
Thus, the United Kingdom has adopted arrest and investigative detention based on a 
reasonable suspicion prior to criminal charge as a preliminary step of criminal 
procedure.230 The United Kingdom has shifted the detention framework from its 
immigration model into pre-trial detention model.231 
 
2. Analysis of the shift to the pre-trial detention framework in the United Kingdom 
(1) Preferable opinions about the adoption of the pre-trail detention framework 
 
The United Kingdom itself seemed to welcome its shift because the United Kingdom Home 
Office indicated that criminal prosecution is the first objective of counter-terrorism policy.232 
Moreover, some academics support the shift of the United Kingdom into the pre-trial 
detention framework for various reasons.233 The first reason is that the United Nations 
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regards criminal law framework is preferable to deal with terrorism.234 The United Nations 
Global Counter and Terrorism Strategy published a Plan of Action for a global strategic 
approach to the counter-terrorism measures of States.235 In the Plan of Action, member 
states agreed to undertake a measure to make every effort to develop and maintain an 
effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system as a counter-terrorism 
measure. 236  This statement clearly shows that an effective criminal justice system is 
regarded as preferable between member states.237 
 
Not only the United Nation but also the International Commission of Jurists 
recommended a criminal framework to fight against terrorism.238 In its 2009 report, the 
Commission pointed out the significance of the criminal justice system by mentioning 
criminal justice has evolved the basic rule of law that innocent people are allowed to go 
free, guilty people are properly punished for their crimes.239 Based on the statement, 
the Commission emphasized the need to place preventive detention within the criminal 
law procedure.240 
 
Lastly, the pre-trial detention framework is regarded to provide established human 
rights safeguards.241 While enhanced human rights are guaranteed under detention 
framework based on criminal procedure, less State and interhuman rights law are 
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applicable under detention framework based on intelligence.242 For example, in the 
criminal law procedure, common law rules excluding improperly or unfairly obtained 
confessions and admissions are existed.243 This rule enables to prevent police from 
interrogating criminal suspects improperly.244 On the other hand, this evidential rule has 
little room to play under a system based on intelligence.245 Moreover, granting human 
rights criminal procedure gives considerable legitimacy to the process.246 For example, 
the independence and impartiality of the judge from the executives, who orders the 
initial period of preventive detention and a detainees' right of appeal to a higher tribunal 
of independent jurists grant considerable fairness in proceedings.247  
Among these reasons, established human rights safeguards as shown in the last 
reason may be the most important one. The United States and the International 
Commission of Jurists mention the significance of the rule of law for their reasons to 
recommend pre-trial detention. This is consistent with the importance of human rights 
safeguards.  
 
(2) Negative opinions about the pre-trial detention framework 
On the other hand, there is some criticism about pre-trial detention framework. First one 
is that the criminal process is not appropriate for counterterrorism in its nature. Criminal 
procedure is retrospective in that arrest is appropriate only after the suspect has 
committed a proscribed act.248 To be sure, most criminal justice systems have modified 
its retrospective focus to a certain degree and adopted laws proactively as shown in 
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inchoate offenses.249 However, even in these offenses, retrospective nature remains in 
most cases because a person is required to be charged with attempt to "dangerously 
close" to committing the crime, or with purpose for a conviction of criminal conspiracy.250 
On the other hand, detentions in the fight against terrorism are predominantly 
prospective due to its focus on preventing feature.251 Therefore, relying on criminal 
procedure requires States to sacrifice its security by requiring States to wait until criminal 
participating in terrorist attack.252  
 
The second criticism is also related to the retrospective nature of criminal procedure. In 
order to take appropriate measures against terrorists effectively, some States may 
change criminal procedure by undermining its safeguards.253 For example, new 
criminal laws were enacted in the United Kingdom as a response to the IRA 
bombings.254 However, this change carries the potential cost of contaminating the 
criminal process because extraordinary powers may be introduced and justified in the 
anti-terrorism context but then spread to other parts of the criminal law.255 Thus, 
adjusting the criminal procedure in the terrorism context may deteriorate ordinal 
criminal procedure. 
 
In addition to retrospective nature, evidence is also difficult to achieve in counter-
terrorism under criminal procedure. Terrorism cases may rely heavily on intelligence 
information, but this kind of information needs to be kept secret for fear that this reveal 
may prevent future investigation to prevent terrorisms.256 On the other hand, a right to 
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fair trial requires exposure of evidence to accused people. Therefore, there is a risk that 
trials for terrorists may not succeed due to its high standard of proof.257  
 
3. Analysis of the Anti-conspiracy law from discussion about the United Kingdom’s practice 
(1) Japan has a problem of human rights safeguard due to long-term detention 
As shown in the analysis above, the pre-trial detention framework is regarded as 
preferable based on the assumption that this framework gives established human 
rights safeguards to detained people. However, Japanese criminal procedure may not 
meet the criteria due to long-term detention. 
 
Under the Japanese system of detention, detention without arrest is not admitted and 
arrest of the suspect is a prerequisite to his or her detention prior to the institution of 
prosecution.258 When the public prosecutor has received the suspect and considers 
that his detention is necessary and supported by reasonable grounds, the prosecutor 
must petition a judge to issue a warrant for his detention.259 Article 205 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure prescribes the time limit for this request is 24 hours after the public 
prosecutor has received the suspect from the police and 72 hours after his or her 
arrest.260 If the judge who received the request for detention decides that the suspect 
should be detained, in principle, the term of detention is 10 days from the date the 
prosecutor petitioned for the term of detention under Article 208 of the Code.261 
However, the term of detention can be extended under Article 208 and Article 209 of 
the Code.262 When there exists an unavoidable delay, the detention can be extended 
by the judge for up to 20 days.263 Article 208 and 209 indicate this extension is 
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regarded as an exception.264 However, in practice, the principle and the exception are 
reversed.265 It is said that Judges routinely allow prosecutors’ requests for arrest and 
detention.266 Thus, in practice, in most cases, it is possible to detain suspects for 23 
days in total from the day of arrest.267  
 
Detaining 23 days before trial may seem to be relatively long, but under Japanese 
criminal procedure, it is possible to detain suspects for much longer term. When a 
detainee is charged for several separate crimes, he or she may be confined on each 
charge, thus 23 days detention can be repeated over and over again.268 This tactic is 
used strategically and sometimes the charges do not have to be new.269 In its 
traditional practice, when a corpse is found, a suspect is first detained on the charge of 
“corpse abandonment” and then, a maximum of 23 days later, he or she is rearrested 
for murder.270  
One of the recent examples of the long-term detention is that of Carlos Ghosn, who 
was a former Nissan Motor Cooperation and Renault Chairman.271 He was arrested 
based on the suspicion of fraud and false reporting.272 The prosecutors requested a 
warrant and waited 23 days and just before the expiration day, they request another 
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warrant.273 The prosecutors repeated this procedure, enabling the suspect in the Tokyo 
Detention House for more than 100 days.274 Another example may be Mark Kapeles, 
former CEO of bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox.275 He was found guilty of data falsification 
and before the sentence, he spent 358 days in detention from his arrest in August 
2015.276 This long-term detention is one of the reasons that Japanese criminal 
procedure is criticized as “hostage justice”.277  
There may be a concern that this long-term detention may be used more often than 
before under cases of the Anti-conspiracy law in order to gain confessions. As shown 
in its negative opinion about pre-trial detention framework, information about suspects 
may be collected mainly by intelligence, which cannot be exposed in trial. Though the 
negative opinion had a concern about failing to reach the high standard of proof, this 
type of failure may not happen in Japan. Japan has an extremely high rate of 
conviction, 99.0 %.278  In order to keep the astonishingly high rate, instead of losing the 
case, prosecutors may try to gain confessions even by abusing their power. 279 
Especially, in Japan, it is regarded most judges rely excessively on confessions as 
proof of guilt.280 Thus, confession may become fundamental evidence for cases of the 
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Anti-conspiracy law. This heavy reliance on confession may cause detain suspects 
repeatedly until they confess their crimes, ending up extremely for the long term.    
 
(2) Heavy reliance of confession may deteriorate the whole criminal system 
The second negative opinion about pre-trial detention may be true to Japan in that 
preeminence of confession may deteriorate the Japanese criminal system. Japan has 
experienced significance numbers of wrongful convictions against innocent people 
based on false confessions.281 From1983 to 1989, four death row cases, namely 
Menda case, Shitagawa case, Shimada case, and Matsuyama case were recognized 
as wrongful convictions by the Japanese court.282 All these defendants were forced to 
confess after long, coercive interrogation.283 This wrongful convictions may have been 
occurred because  courts have trusted evidences from prosecutors especially 
confessions automatically.  
However, there may be a tendency to reform its excessive trust on evidences from 
prosecutors. One recent example is a case known as Shibushi. Shibushi is a name of a 
small town in western Japan.284 Thirteen people living in the town were arrested under 
suspicion of vote-buying in 2003.285 The police made them confess by putting them for 
a long-term detention, ending up months of detention for several cases.286 However, all 
of them were recognized innocent in 2007 in a district court. The judge regarded their 
confessions as gained forcibly by mentioning they had “made confessions in despair 
while going through marathon questioning”.287 The judge analyzed the process of 
                                                 
281 ibid 1253–1254. 
282 ibid 1254. 
283 ibid. 
284 Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Pressed by Police, Even Innocent Confess in Japan - The New York Times’ 
(The New York Times, 11 May 2007) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/world/asia/11japan.html> accessed 6 October 2019. 
285 ibid. 
286 ibid. 
287 ibid. 
52 
 
gaining confessions without adopting the confessions automatically.288 This judgment 
may show courts' recent attitude to break away from excessive trust of confession.    
This preferable tendency may be overturned. Under cases of the Anti-conspiracy law, 
judges may adopt confessions as proof even if confessions have doubt of being gained 
forcibly in order to protect its nation from terrorist threat. As the negative opinion about 
the pre-trial detention framework mentions, there is no guarantee that this attitude 
would be limited to terrorism cases. Rather, this tendency would deteriorate the whole 
Japanese criminal procedures, going back to a criminal system a decade ago and this 
would increase the risk of wrongful convictions.  
 
(3)  Japan has problems with human rights safeguards due to ‘substitute prison’. 
Japanese criminal procedures may have problems not only because of long-term detention 
but also because of the "substitute prison" (Daiyo Kangoku) system. These detention 
facilities are jails that are attached to police stations and acts as detention centers during 
interrogation and investigation process.289 While the Code of Criminal Procedure requires 
that suspects be detained in penal institutions, the Penal Detention Facilities Act prescribes 
suspects may be detained alternatively in detention facilities, which is called the “substitute 
detention system.” In practice, in almost all cases, this ‘substitute prison’ is used for 
detaining suspects.290 Under this system, suspects can be detained in police detention 
facilities for a period of up to 23 days to facilitate investigations without the possibility of bail 
and with limited access to a lawyer. 291 There is no other system in the world where police 
detention can be continued for as many as 20 days.292 This is another reason that the 
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Japanese criminal system is sometimes criticized as “hostage justice”.293  
 
The system of the “substitute prison” has been repeatedly criticized by the Human Rights 
Committee in its periodic report. In 1998, the Committee raised concern that the system 
was not under the control of a separate authority., though subject to a branch of the police, 
which does not deal with investigation,294 Based on the concern, the Committee pointed 
out the system may increase the chances of abuse of the rights of detainees.295 In 2008, 
the Committee pointed out that under the substitute prison system, suspects can be 
detained in police detention facilities for a period of up to 23 days to facilitate investigations, 
without the possibility of bail and with limited access to a lawyer especially during the first 
72 hours of arrest.296 Based on the point, the Committee again raised concern that the 
substitute detention system increases the risk of prolonged interrogations and abusive 
interrogation methods to obtain a confession.297 And the Committee recommended that 
Japan should abolish the detention system.298 In 2014, the Human Rights Committee 
criticized the Japanese attitude more clearly. The Committee showed its explicit regret for 
Japanese government’s attitude of continuing to justify the use of substitute prison by citing 
the lack of available resources and the efficiency of the system. 299  Moreover, the 
Committee maintained its concern that the system reinforces the risk of extracting forced 
confessions combined with the absence of an entitlement to bail or a right to State-
appointed counsel prior to the indictment300 
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Not only the Human Rights Committee but also the Committee against Torture criticized 
substitute prisons. In 2013, in its periodic report, the Committee expressed its serious 
concern at the lack of safeguards in the substitute prison system.301 In 2007, the Committee 
mentioned this facility increases the possibilities of abuse of their rights, and may lead to a 
de facto failure to respect the principles of presumption of innocence, right to silence and 
right of defense.302 Then, the Committee clearly recommended that Japan should limit the 
use of police cells during pre-trial detention.303 
 
Despite internationally grave concern, the Japanese government has been reluctant to 
abolish the system of substitute prison. 304  Rather, the government may be eager to 
maintain this system. Japan has not accepted recommendations about the abolition of 
substitute prison even though the same recommendations were made from the 1st 
Universal Periodic Review, which took place more than 10 years ago.305 More clearly, in 
2013, in a meeting of the periodic report by the Committee against torture, the government 
revealed its position that the abolition or reform of the pretrial detention system was 
unnecessary.306 Again in 2018, in its views about recommendation by Universal Periodic 
Review, the government repeated its position by mentioning ‘Japan believes there is no 
need to reform the current detention system.’307  
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Under cases of the Anti-conspiracy law, as shown above, confession may hold an important 
position in trial. Especially combined with long-term detention, substitute prison can be 
more problematic because the facility enables police to interrogate suspects for an 
extremely long time while depriving the suspects of sleep and food and forbidding them 
from using a restroom.308 Under the Japanese criminal system, there is no strict regulation 
about the time duration of interrogations, and thus, it is possible to interrogate suspects 
even until late at night.309  
This would cause worsening detainee’s mental condition because they may think 
prosecutors may be able to detain them in this severe condition with new allegations again 
and again until they confess. Thus, substitute detention system under cases of the Anti-
conspiracy law may violate basic human rights safeguard such as presumption of 
innocence and right to silence. Therefore, even though the Anti-conspiracy law is within a 
framework of pre-trial detention, the detention may not be preferable.   
 
B. Analysis of the problems of the Anti-conspiracy law with reference to the United States’ practice  
1. History of the United States’ preventive detention measures against terrorism 
(1)  Various preventive detention measures before the 9.11 terrorist attack 
In this section, this essay tries to reveal problems of the Anti-conspiracy law with 
reference to the United States' practice about preventive detention. To understand the 
practice, a brief history of preventive detention against terrorism in the United States 
needs to be looked through.  
 
It is without saying that a series of horrific and devastating terrorist attacks in the United 
States on 11 September 2001 caused harsh response against terrorism known as ‘a war 
against terrorism’.310 However, the United States government targeted Osama Bin Laden 
and his Al Qaeda network through a series of anti-terrorist programs dating back to the 
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mid-1990's, which was well before the 9.11 terrorist attack.311 With this aim, several 
preventive measures have been used to detain terrorists preventatively although 
preventive detention of terror suspects itself is not permitted in the United States' 
domestic law. 312  For example, the United States has used numerous offences that 
include conspiracy elements to arrest and detain suspects preventively.313 Moreover, the 
material support statutes permit arrest suspects preventively without proof of 
performance of any actual harm.314 For example, in 2349A, forty-seven offenses are 
prescribed such as bombing a place of public use, a government facility, or a 
transportation system, or killing, injuring persons in the United States or using a 
dangerous weapon in a way that involves conduct that transcends national 
boundaries.315 2349A enables to detain suspects when he or she provided support with 
the intent or knowledge that the support would be used for or, in preparation for, the 
predicate offense.316 Thus, prosecutors may be able to intervene in and disrupt nefarious 
activity at a very early stage. 317  Furthermore, a material witness statute has been 
misused as a counter-terrorism measure.318 This statue, dating back 1789, enables to 
detain persons believed to be a material witness to a crime if a judicial officer determines 
that such a person would flee if served with a subpoena to testify at grand jury 
proceedings or a trial.319 Though this detention is solely to guarantee his or her civic duty 
of giving evidence, this framework was used to detain terrorists.320  
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(2) Adoption of the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States drastically 
changed its scheme against terrorism in order to take measures effectively.321 This 
shift may be well described by Attorney General John Ashcroft's statement in his 
address to the House that "[w]e cannot wait for terrorists to strike to begin 
investigations and to take action... We must prevent first - we must prosecute 
second".322 
First, an emergency directive was issued by the Attorney General on 19 September 
2001 allowing for the detention of non-nationals based on a suspicion of being 
involved in terrorism.323 This instrument enabled the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service to hold non-nationals in custody without charge for 48 hours or for "an 
additional reasonable time, if necessary, under an emergency, or in other 
extraordinary circumstances".324 
 
However, the most noteworthy law enacted as a response to the terrorist attacks may 
be the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).325 By amending section 
1182 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 411 of the  PATRIOT Act, 
entitled "Definitions Relating to Terrorism," expanded a definition of "terrorist activity" 
and "engaging in terrorist activity" into including those who use a firearm during any 
unlawful activity.326 Besides, section 411 redefines the term "engage in terrorist 
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activity", making an alien removable by merely providing food or housing for a friend 
or family member who is allegedly involved with a terrorist organization, whether or 
not such alien knew that the friend or family member was involved in such activity.327 
 
Section 412 of the Patriot Act enables to allow the indefinite detention of aliens. 
Section (a) of 236A of the Patriot Act, entitled 'Mandatory Detention of Suspected 
Terrorists', sanctions the detention for up to seven days without charge of non-
nationals who are terrorists, supporters of terrorist activity or "engaged in any other 
activity that endangers the national security of the United States".328 Persons are so 
classified where the Attorney General has "reasonable grounds to believe that they 
are involved in terrorism or that they constitute a threat to national security”.329 
Additionally, non-nationals may be held for seven days without even being charged 
with a crime, let alone an immigration violation.330 After the seven days, the detained 
shall be placed in removal proceedings or charged with a criminal offense and if 
neither are instituted the detainee must then be released.331 However, after removal 
proceedings have been initiated, where the removal "is unlikely in the reasonably 
foreseeable future" and "if the release of the alien will threaten the national security of 
the United States or the safety of the community or any person", indefinite detention 
may be possible.332  
 
2. Critics against the US practice 
(1)  Broad definition of terrorism under section 411 may cause arrest of those who are 
not related to terrorism 
 
There is a concern that the definition of terrorism under the Patriot Act is too 
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broad.333 Under Section 211.1(1)(a) and (2)(b) of the Model Penal Code prescribes 
that an assault occurs when one causes injury to another's person with or without a 
deadly weapon.334This crime is within the scope of Section 411 of the PATRIOT 
Act.335 Thus, under the PATRIOT Act, an alien may be regarded as terrorist only if 
she hits her boyfriend with a stick, breaking his arm and hold the suspect 
indefinitely.336 Similarly, the PATRIOT Act makes someone a terrorist for burning 
down her own business, even if the assault commits a crime to collect money from 
her insurance company.337 Therefore, the broad definition of terrorism would cause 
undesirable discretion to detain people under the name of terrorism even though, in 
fact, their crimes have nothing to do with terrorism.  
 
(2) Discrimination against non-nationals especially against Arab origin 
Another concern is that such detentions have caused discrimination against certain 
groups. The executive powers of detention in the US target not only members of al-
Qaeda but also all foreign nationals who are suspected of having links with terrorist 
groups.338 However, in 2006, for example, the clear majority of prosecutions for 
terrorist crimes in the United States did not involve foreign terrorist organizations.339 
Rather, a large part of those individuals who have been charged with terrorism 
offenses that are allegedly related to are US citizens.340 Therefore, a law allowing 
indefinite detention only for foreign nationals does not have any justifiable grounds 
to treat foreign nationals and US citizens differently. This discrimination is more 
serious for those of Arab origin in that various reports mention people are arrested 
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merely because they are of Arab origin.341 Thus, there is a concern that executive 
power targets a certain group of people just because of their origin or appearance, 
which causes discrimination.342  
 
(3) Low rate of success under the PATRIOT Act 
It is not denying that there has difficulty to assess the effectiveness of preventive 
detention campaigns precisely because governments will insist on the success of the 
campaigns.343 Nevertheless, it would seem relatively reasonable to expect that the 
authorities would be able to bring at least some of these cases before the courts.  
On the contrary, statistics reveal that, of the more than 1,000 foreigners preventively 
detained in the United States immediately after September 11, only three have been 
charged with any terrorism-related crime.344 This rate may be more shocking by 
comparison with numbers prior September 11. Before September 11, the average 
percentage of charges that were brought before the courts on suspicion of terrorism 
involvement was more than 50 percent. 345  This low rate of success under new 
detention measures may imply failure of the new measure. 
 
3. Analysis of the Anti-conspiracy law with reference to the critics against the US practice  
(1) Risk of arrest of people who are not related to terrorism 
While the PATRIOT Act has a problem due to its broad definition, the Anti-
conspiracy has a similar problem due to its broad scope of the law. Based on the 
government's explanation, the Anti-conspiracy law was for counter-terrorism. 
Then, the scope of criminalization also had to be related to terrorism. However, 
some crimes that are not related to terrorisms were also punishable under the law. 
For example, breaching some of the articles of the Forest Act, the Cultural 
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Properties Preservation Act, and the Copyright Act, are punishable under the 
law.346 Consider some group members copy musical scores and distribute others. 
This breaches Article 119 of the Copyright Act, which prohibits violations of 
copyrights, but this act does not have anything to do with terrorism.347 However, 
this act would be punishable under the law.348 This wide scope of the Anti-
conspiracy law may give undesirably abusive discretion to police about arresting 
people. 
 
(2) Risk of discrimination in practice 
Although unlike the United States, under the Anti-conspiracy law, there is no formal 
difference between citizens and non-citizens, that does not necessarily guarantee 
there is non-discrimination in applying the law.349 Rather, there is a concern that anti-
state activists can be targeted discriminately under the Anti-conspiracy law.350 For 
example, the government explained that Non-Profit Organizations would be excluded 
from the target of the bill. 351  However, as revealed in chapter III, there remains 
vagueness of the scope of the Anti-conspiracy law because of its ambiguity of the term 
"terrorist groups or other criminal groups." Considering NGOs sometimes take a 
contrary view of government actions and works, this vagueness of the term would 
cause a risk that police or prosecutors would label NGOs as enemies or illegal 
organizations or even terrorist organizations in order to oppress these organizations’ 
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activities.352 
 
In fact, there may be already tendency that detention is applied discriminately severely 
toward those who have an anti-state view. One of the recent examples is the arrest 
and charging of Hiroji Yamashiro, who is a resident of Okinawa.353 The excessive 
concentration of more than 70 percent of United States military bases in Okinawa, 
which comprises only 0.6 percent of the land of Japan, has long been a source of 
conflict between local people living in Okinawa and the government.354 Mr. Yamashiro 
is a leader of the civilian protest of the construction in Okinawa, of the new military 
base and facilities of the United States of America.355 While anger among the Okinawa 
residents grew as the government promoted the construction in Okinawa of the United 
States military base, the police repeatedly arrested Mr. Yamamoto aiming to chill public 
protest and dissent.356 Mr. Yamashiro was first arrested on 17 October 2016 for a minor 
offense of cutting barbed wire, with the damage amounting to 2,000 yen. 357 
Continuously, Mr. Yamashiro was arrested on  20 October for obstruction of 
performance of public duty and causation of injury and then again on 20 November 
2016 for forcible obstruction of business.358 In the end, Mr. Yamashiro was released 
on 18 March 2017 due to bail after five months in detention.359 Considering the long-
term detention, the Japanese government appears to target discriminately and arrest 
Mr. Yamashiro for his exercise of the rights and freedoms as an Okinawan pacifist and 
environmentalist.360 Not only the duration of the detention but also the treatment in the 
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detention may have been discriminately. Though there was little risk of flight or 
evidence tampering, Mr. Yamashiro was not even permitted to contact his wife for 
months.361 As the Working Group pointed out, there is no way but to consider that the 
Government was meant to have a chilling effect on Mr. Yamashiro and his fellow 
Okinawan protesters for their vocal opposition to the construction of the United States 
military bases in Okinawa.362 This case was under different laws, but this kind of 
discrimination is also possible under the Anti-conspiracy law. Thus, there is a risk of 
discrimination in applying the law by targeting and arresting only those who protest the 
government's view under the name of counterterrorism and national security.    
 
(3) No arrested cases under the Anti-conspiracy law  
Regarding the rate of success, the Japanese situation may be worse than the 
United States' one. On July 9th, 2019, the Minister of Justice revealed there have 
been no arrested case so far under the Anti-conspiracy law.363  There have been 
more than two years since the law passed and only one year is left before the 2020 
Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games. If, as the government explained, there was 
a risk of being targeted by terrorists, there should have been at least some arrested 
cases. The fact that there have been no arrested cases may show there was no 
need for new measures against terrorism including enactment of the Anti-
conspiracy. Moreover, Tokyo is already regarded as one of the safest cities all over 
the world.364  Japan has been attacked by Japanese terrorists only once in 1995 
and after that, no terrorist attack has ever happened.365 Considering the fact, there 
may not be persuasive that Japan is endangered with attacks by terrorists.  
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In addition, as some academics point out, the increasing number of solo actor or 
“lone wolf” cannot be charged with conspiracy.366 There are several reasons for this 
uprising. One of the reasons is that terrorist groups seem to encourage solo 
terrorist acts.367 For example, Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch published a magazine 
article in English, inciting attacks by lone operatives and providing a bomb alone.368 
Al-Qaeda also released a video encouraging unilateral violence titled, "You Are 
Only Responsible for Yourself.”369 Another reason for the growing phenomenon of 
the “lone wolf” is that Internet has enabled to commit terrorists without group 
training nor group reinforcement because all information such as guns and 
explosive to government facilities can be obtained on website.370 If this trend of solo 
terrorist continues, there would be none or little arrest cases under the Anti-
conspiracy law because agreement between parties must exist for police to arrest 
them. Therefore, this trend also casts doubt about the necessity and efficiency of 
the Anti-conspiracy law. 
   
V. Conclusion 
The Act on the Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (the 
Anti-conspiracy law) is an unprecedented law that changes the Japanese Penal 
Code in that it establishes a new category to criminalizes acts at the stage of 
conspiracy.   
 
In the first chapter, this essay revealed a brief history of Japanese preventive 
detention by introducing the Maintenance of the Pubic Order Act ant the continuous 
government’s efforts to enact an Anti-conspiracy law until 2005. The Maintenance of 
                                                 
366 see Webber (n 310) 172. 
367 Kendall Coffey, ‘The Lone Wolf - Solo Terrorism and the Challenge of Preventative Prosecution’ 
[2011] FIU Law Review 1, 3. 
368 ibid. 
369 ibid. 
370 see ibid 3–4. 
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the Public Order Act included the concept of preventive detention for the first time in 
Japanese history. During World War II, this Act was largely abused by police to 
oppress communists, who questioned  absolute power of the Japanese Emperor, and 
this Act caused hundreds of thousands of innocent people arrested and more than 
one thousand people were dead due to torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, or other 
reasons. This notorious image of preventive detention may be one of the reasons 
that Japanese local people strongly opposed to the enactment of the Anti-conspiracy 
law. Noticing the potential risk of the law, local people, the JFBA and the Opposing 
Parties strongly opposed to the Bill about anti-conspiracy, although the government 
repeatedly explained the need for enacting the law with relation to the UNCTOC. This 
opposition succeeded to abandon the Bill for three times.  
 
However, the government finally succeeded to enact the Anti-conspiracy law for its 
fourth attempt. In the first half of the second chapter, this essay revealed various 
tactics used by the government in order to enact the law. First, the Government 
changed the abbreviated name into “the Offence to Criminalize an Act in Furtherance 
of Planning to Commit Terrorism and Other Serious Crimes”, aiming to eradicate its 
negative image, which often combined with the notorious history of the Maintenance 
of the Public Order Act. Second, the government emphasized terrorist aspects in 
order to impress the law did not target ordinary people. Third, the government limited 
its scope of the Bill as response to previous criticism. Although the Special 
Rapporteur gave deep concern about the potential risk of human rights violations 
about the law, the government immediately criticized that the letter to understate the 
concern. letter. Furthermore, the government rammed through the Bill at the House 
of Representatives and moreover, skipped a vote in the Upper House Committee on 
Judicial Affairs. By revealing these tactics, it can be said that the Anti-conspiracy law 
does not have support or understanding from Japanese people.  
 
In the latter half of the second chapter, this essay revealed problems of the Anti-
conspiracy law by reference to the Article 9 of the ICCPR. The article prohibits 
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arbitrary arrest and detention. This essay clarified not only the vagueness of the 
wording of a law but also the complexity of the structure of the law should be included 
for analysing the element of predictability, which is one of the elements of 
arbitrariness.  The Anti-conspiracy law has complex structure in that an individual 
must check Article6(2), Appendix 3, and Appendix 4 of the law, and sometimes even 
other laws in order to predict whether his or her conduct would be punished. 
Moreover, lack of definition of “terrorist groups” may cause vagueness of the word 
“terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups". This complexity of the law and 
vagueness of the term of the law may breach Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
 
In the last chapter, this essay revealed other fundamental problems that the Anti-
conspiracy law has with reference to the United Kingdom’s practice and the United 
States’ practice. In the first half of the chapter, this essay analysed discussion about 
United Kingdom’s shift into pre-trial detention framework, and this essay revealed for 
pre-trial detention to be regarded desirable, enough human rights safeguards need to 
be provided. With this regard, Japan may not have these basics because of long-
term detention and the existence of substitute prison. Moreover, more reliance on 
confessions may happen under the Anti-conspiracy law, which has a risk of 
increasing wrongful convictions.  
The United States was the country that was attacked by terrorists on 11 September 
2001 and this attack caused harsh response against terrorism. However, this shift 
may not be successful in that the definition of the PATRIOT Act was too vague and 
detentions may have caused discrimination. The rate of charging suspects before 
courts is much lower than that of before September 11. Similar concerns may be held 
in the Anti-conspiracy law in that crimes unrelated to terrorism may fall under the 
scope of the law and in that there is a risk of discrimination in applying the law only 
for those who have anti-state views. Moreover, the fact that there have no cases of 
arrest since the law was enacted two years ago and the uprising phenomenon of lone 
wolf show that the Anti-conspiracy law may not be helpful as counter-terrorism. 
 
67 
 
The Japanese government failed to pass the Anti-conspiracy law three times mainly 
due to strong opposition and nevertheless proposed the bill to enact anti-conspiracy 
for the fourth time. Then, the Anti-conspiracy law was enacted by using various 
unusual steps. These facts show the government's persistence about enacting the 
Anti-conspiracy law.  
Though the government explained the Anti-conspiracy law is against terrorism,  this 
essay revealed the law does not seem to target terrorists considering the UNCTOC is 
not against terrorism and the government itself did not explain the need for enacting 
the law with relation to terrorism for the previous three times. 
Moreover, this essay may give implications of the real reason why the government 
was eager to enact this controversial law. Under the Anti-conspiracy law, crimes that 
are not related to terrorism may be punishable. Thus, the government may target 
those who have an anti-state view. Under the Japanese criminal procedure known as 
"hostage justice", detaining people for long term and interrogating them under severe 
condition is possible. This would cause severe impact not only for detained people 
but also those who are along with them because these people may refrain from their 
activities for fear of being arrested. Through this process, the government may be 
able to oppress various anti-state activities. This oppression was what happened 
during World War II under the Maintenance of the Public Order Act against 
communists. In that sense, this law has potential risk of being renewed version of the 
Maintenance of the Public Order Act.  In order to avoid this tragedy happening, 
appropriate application of the Anti-conspiracy law is needed. Thus, it is necessary for 
Japanese people to make all efforts to prevent abuse of the Anti-conspiracy law.   
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